Index: Jinnah's religious beliefs

The following posts on this blog relate to Jinnah's personal religious beliefs.

1. Jinnah's religion - 1 : A collection of material from Aamir Mughal.
2. Jinnah's religion - 2 : Jinnah and a Khoja solicitor, 1927 or 1928.
3. Jinnah's religion - 3 : The dispute over the inheritance laws applicable to Jinnah's estate
4. Jinnah's religion - 4 : Jinnah on his sect's beliefs, 1917.
5. Jinnah's religion - 5 : Khaled Ahmed from The Friday Times, 2010
6. Jinnah's religion - 6 : 1998 rediff.com article on Jinnah's religion
7. Jinnah's religion - 7 :  MQM leader Altaf Hussain's claims about Jinnah's religion
8. Jinnah's religion - 8 :  Jaswant Singh's description of Khojas.
9. Jinnah's religion - 9 : Jinnah annoyed by being termed "Muslim renegade"

Jinnah's activities as a Mahomedan politician 1913-1915

Based on

The Works of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah

Volume II (1913-1916)

Editor: Dr. Riaz Ahmad

Quaid-i-Azam University, 1996

and

All India Muslim League Vol I

Encyclopedia of Political Party Series

Editor-in-Chief O.P. Ralhan

Anmol Publications, 1997

March 22, 1913 - Jinnah at the annual session of the All India Muslim League, succeeded in getting its constitution to ask for self-government for India on lines suitable to India's special needs, instead of self-government for India on colonial lines (as Mazharul Haque pushed for).

October 1913 - Jinnah joined the All India Muslim League

December 20, 1913 - Presidential address at the Anjuman-i-Islam, Bombay

May 1, 1947 - US officials visit Jinnah

May 1 1947 - At his Bombay residence, Jinnah met with Raymond Hare, US State Dept. Division of Middle Eastern and Indian Affairs, and Thomas Weil, second secretary at the US Embassy at New Delhi.  This meeting was described in "Secret Telegram from George R. Merrell, Charge de Affaires US Embassy New Delhi to Secretary of State George C. Marshall, May 2, 1947,  Foreign Relations of the United States 1947 Volume 3, :154-155."  Cited by Hussain Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding.




845.00/5-247 : Telegram

The Chargé in India (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

SECRET                                                                     NEW DELHI, May 2, 1947—10 a. m.

299. In hour and half conversation with Hare and Weil [1] yesterday, Jinnah said Congress demand for partition Bengal and Punjab would not "frighten" him into joining union center; that even if "driven into Sind desert" he would refuse to join union.  He said establishment Pakistan essential to prevent "Hindu imperialism" spreading into Middle East;  Muslim countries would stand together against possible Russian aggression and would look to US for assistance.   Reminded of Dawn's [2] frequent jibes re US economic imperialism and dollar diplomacy, he said Dawn editors simply reflected attitude of Indian Muslims in general towards US and added jokingly "they had to make a living".  He said while he realized US Govt probably open-minded re Pakistan, most Indian Muslims felt Americans were against them (a) because most Americans seemed opposed to Pakistan and (b) US Govt and people backed Jews against Arabs in Palestine.

[1] Raymond A. Hare of the Division of Middle Eastern and Indian Affairs, and Thomas E. Weil, Second Secretary of Embassy at New Delhi.
[2] Daily newspaper published in New Delhi; official organ of the Muslim League.

Jinnah said he thought if Calcutta area were included in Pakistan, Hindus would adjust selves to situation but if they didn't they would have to be brought under control and he thought this would "not take very long".  Apropos Punjab, he said Sikhs would be fairly treated and would have as many representatives in Pakistan Parliament as Sind or NWFP.   Said he thought announcement HMG's decision on Pakistan would clear atmosphere and reduce communal tension.

Jinnah's manner was calm and gracious and he showed none of nervousness or effects of illness noted by Jones of New York Times on April 19 (mitel280, April 21 [3])

Difficult to believe eventual announcement HMG's decision on Pakistan with or without partition of Bengal or Punjab will clear communal atmosphere.  Force will undoubtedly have to be employed to control rebellious elements in Bengal and Punjab no matter who receives power from HMG in those areas.

Please repeat London.

MERRELL

[3] Not printed.

Interview: Maya Tudor : The Promise of Power

 From the Indian Express

 Unlike the Congress, the Muslim League failed to create a social and economic programme, or rural-urban alliances’

Maya Tudor, a lecturer in government and public policy at Oxford University, recently published ‘The Promise of Power’, investigating the origins of India and Pakistan’s regime divergence in the aftermath of independence. In Delhi for a lecture tour, she spoke to Yamini Lohia. Excerpts {of excerpts}

In your book, you identified the leading political parties, the Congress and the Muslim League, as the major difference between India and Pakistan at the time of Partition. How do you think their leadership contributed to the divergent paths?
 
I wouldn’t say it was leadership. ....... But the parties were more than their leaders, at least in India, and that was the difference. It was just leaders in the case of Pakistan. There wasn’t much of a party organisation in terms of real representation in rural areas and a real programme. So on issues like what kind of programme of economic governance India was going to pursue, what kind of social programme and what the ideology of citizenship was — what made the Indian citizen an Indian citizen — on all these questions, India’s nationalist movement did more to develop a clear programme. They weren’t addressed in Pakistan until much later. India also built a movement that had substantial support in the countryside. That’s what made a difference.

Jinnah : Pakistan not a bargaining counter

Back on January 3, 1941, Mr. Jinnah said, in an interview with a London newspaper that the British Government, the Parliament and the public would be making the greatest mistake if they believed the Congress "propaganda" that the demand for Pakistan was merely put forward as a counter for bargaining.

In his address to the Special Pakistan Session of the Punjab Muslim Students Federation, on March 2, 1941, Jinnah again reiterated that partitioning India was a matter of life and death to Mussalmans and was not a counter for bargaining.

To the Ahmedabad Muslim Students Union, reported in the Dawn on January 16, 1945, Jinnah said that British statesmen "encouraged the theory of united India....so that they can play the role of arbitrator and mere[sic] cut the kind of justice which the monkey dispensed to the two cats. Opposition to Pakistan, Mr. Jinnah said, might be due to false notions or sentiments or because it was a new idea.  Some said that it was a hoax and worse still it was a bargaining counter because Mr Jinnah was an astute politician. He asserted that it was neither a hoax nor a slogan for bargaining."..."By division of India and the establishment of two governments, Pakistan and Hindustan, Mr. Jinnah said, distrust would have gone".

Why did Jinnah recognize Kalat as an independent state?

The British position in Lord Wavell/Lord Mountbatten's time was that Kalat was like any other Indian princely state.  Nevertheless, Lord Mountbatten mediated negotiations between M.A. Jinnah and the Khan of Kalat and Jinnah, on behalf of Pakistan, recognized Kalat as a sovereign, independent state.  The question is - why did Jinnah adopt that position?

The answer has to do with the legal position of the Indian princely states.   Under the Indian Independence Act, British paramountcy would lapse, and all treaties between the princely states and Great Britain would cease to have effect.   However, all British Indian treaties with sovereign states would continue to be in effect, and be inherited by the newly independent India and Pakistan.

The British had obtained a perpetual lease of Quetta and surrounding areas from the Khan of Kalat.  If Kalat was a sovereign state, then Pakistan would inherit that lease.   If Kalat was a princely state of British India, the lease would lapse, and  Quetta would revert to Kalat. Pakistan's claim on it would depend on whether the Khan of Kalat acceded to Pakistan or not.

Some of the evidence for this answer is presented below. It is in reverse chronological order.

1926: Jinnah in Canada and the USA

Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan (1984), page 88:

Jinnah had been appointed to the assembly's Sandhurst Committee in 1925, chaired by then army chief of staff Lieutenant General Sir Andrew Skeen, to study the feasibility of establishing a military college like Sandhurst in India.  He was one of three Indian subcommittee members invited to undertake the grand tour of inspection of military colleges and installations overseas, leaving Bombay early in April and returning home in August.

Report of the Indian Sandhurst Committee, dated 14th November 1926, published 1927 (found via the State Library of Victoria, Australia) tells us that a sub-committee was constituted that

...consisted of Mr. Jinnah, Sir Phiroze Sethna, and Major Zorawar Singh.  Leaving India about the beginning of April 1926, the members first met in London at the end of April.  They visited educational institutions of all kinds in England and also toured in France, Canada and the United States...They returned to India on August 13th, 1926.

Traces of the visit to North America have been hard to come by.