From:
The Transfer of Power 1942-47, Volume III, 21 September
1942-12 June 1943, editors Mansergh, Lumby.
Emphasis added.
Item #669, Pages 918-922
Note on the proceedings of the session of the All-India Muslim League
at Delhi,
24 to 26 April 1943
{Enclosed in the letter of 11 May 1943 from the Deputy
Private Secretary to the Viceroy to the Private Secretary to the Secretary of
State.}
STRICTLY SECRET
1.
Taken against previous reports, the proceedings
of the All-India Muslim League Session have caused no surprise. Jinnah’s speeches both in the meetings of
the Working Committee and the Subjects Committee (held in camera) and in the Open Session have confirmed impressions that
of late his mind has been passing through a certain process of change. He has
become more aggressive, more challenging and more authoritative. The reason appears to be “consciousness
of power lately acquired and of certain old injuries which can now be avenged
therewith”.
It cannot be denied that he is
today more powerful than he ever has been.
Sir Sikander’s death and the consequential disappearance of the fear of
a strong rival Muslim organization being created, the formation of League
Ministries in various Provinces, the
spinelessness of the new Punjab Premier which circumstance has for the first
time exposed that vital part of the Pakistan organism to his direct
encroachments, the recent successes in
bye-elections and the deterioration of the Congress power constitute a set of
circumstances which have lent an unusual lustre to Jinnah’s leadership and
augmented his strength and striking power to a degree never before attained.
On the other hand four years of
close study of the British attitude towards the Muslims appear to have forced
on him the final conclusion that the British are not prepared to give to the
Muslims anything material beyond the few barren references to the “greatness”
of the Muslim community with which British Statesmen have lately been
embellishing their speeches in [on?] India.
“If”, he argues, “the Congress has gone astray, why are the British not
inviting us to form a government at the Centre? If the Congress did not accept the Cripps
proposals, what then has prevented the
British from conceding the Muslim right to self-determination immediately and
independently of the Congress?”
Jinnah was quiet so long as he
lacked the power to assert himself and have this unpromising situation
altered. But now he has developed the
necessary power and sanctions.
2.
These considerations have been uppermost in
Jinnah’s mind while he has been addressing the various Committees and the Open
Session. He has clearly indicated that
he is determined no longer to take things lying down. As a matter of fact, he has tried to go
through all the preliminaries with which the new storm of his making must be
prefaced. He has finally warned the
British; he has expressed his profound
dissatisfaction with their attitude; he has urged Provincial Leagues now to place
themselves on a war footing in preparation for what is to come; he has castigated
the Capitalists and pampered the masses (on whose sympathy and goodwill he has
to base his future struggle) by his references to “social justice” and
“economic reorganization”; he has tried
to impress upon the Provincial Premiers the fact that their own future lies
only in following his lead and above all he has, in order to show his bona fides to the neutral world,
extended an open and almost final invitation to the Congress to approach him
for a settlement if it so desires.
Inevitably the next stage will be “preparation for the inevitable
struggle” and after that the “struggle” itself.
3.
In
amplification of this point, Jinnah spoke to the Working Committee, where he
was able to expose his mind more freely, something as follows :—
“About the future, there are two sets of suggestion[s];
(1) to
take direct action here and now to force Britain to accept the Muslim demands,
and
(2) to
wait and watch.
The extremists would wish the League forthwith to declare war on Britain, and
one of them, Mr. G.M. Syed even recommends that as a token of Muslim
resentment, members of the Working Committee should in the first instance court
imprisonment and at the same time Muslim Leaguers should be called upon to
withdraw from the War Committees.
Then there are the Moderates who maintain that the League should rest satisfied
over the formation of Ministries in Bengal, Sind, Assam and the Punjab. No one, however, takes a balanced and
realistic view of the situation.
The situation is this: the Congress is determined to defy the Muslims. But it has now paid the penalty. It has been crushed and it has ceased to
claim that it also represents the Musalmans.
It may not act as we would wish, but at the same time it is not longer
capable of substantially harming us.
The wounds it has received will take some time to heal and so we are for
the time being free from its terror.
Besides it is not under the present circumstances in a position to give
us anything. We want Pakistan and that commodity is available not in the Congress
market but in the British market. In
other words, the Congress danger has ceased to exist for the time being. Let us, therefore, not bother too much about
it but maintain a watchful attitude.
Then comes our second enemy, the Britisher.
How do we stand in relation to him?
Well, he is as useless for our purpose as the Congress and he is as
callous and defiant as any enemy can be.
His anxiety throughout has been to court the Congress, and he feels that
his Imperialist interests demand that he should permanently keep the Mussalmans
down. He is gravely suspicious of the Mussalmans. In the rise of the Muslim power, he sees the
end of his own supremacy in the East.
Therefore, beyond soft words, the Muslims can expect nothing from him.
Nor can the Muslims associate any
high hopes with the so-called Post-war New World Order. The
end of this war is going to leave the Britisher so powerful that he will be
able to defy the world opinion wherever it conflicts with his own Imperialistic
designs. At the end of the war the
Britisher will be more powerful than any of his Allies. And if he is really powerful and if he has
successfully emerged at the expense of his Allies, why should he listen to the
counsels of his weak allies or even to the world? He has not been fighting this war to enable
visionaries to advise him as to how he should liquidate his own power. Therefore,
neither now nor henceforth is there any possibility of the British willingly
conferring upon us the boon of Pakistan.
On the contrary, in the post-war
period, there is every likelihood of a British-Muslim conflict on a grand
scale. There are various issues which
may give rise to such a conflict, e.g., Palestine or Syria, or the withdrawal
of the British from Iran, Egypt and Baghdad.
Collectively these issues form but part of the general world problem and
when it comes to the point, the Muslims
of various countries will have to sink or swim together. It is impossible for British Imperialism to
yield to Muslim opinion in all these fields.
On one issue or the other, there
is bound to be an open clash.
We must prepare ourselves to play our part in that major clash. Naturally, we shall require elaborate
arrangements. None of the small mercies
show to us recently by the Provincial Governors in Sind or Bengal can lull us
into a false sense of security. These
favours have not been granted because the British love us. It is
in order to expose us before the masses to whom we have been making extravagant
promises that we have been saddled with this responsibility.
The same trick was played with the
Congress when they were given a long rope in the shape of Ministries to hang
themselves. Had this not been done,
there would have been no Hindu-Muslim bitterness such as now exists. If Congress had not accepted office, it would
not have lost its former hold over the agrarian and labour populations, or its
former popularity with certain sections of Muslims. The British have brought League Ministries
into existence so that our promises to our people are put to the test, so that
we feel and thereby stand self-condemned and so that there should arise local
and internal complications within the League.
I am genuinely afraid that the
British will not allow the League to do anything substantial for the Muslim
masses in order that the Muslim League shall stand discredited in the eyes of
its own people. Therefore, let us not lay down our tools merely because
seventeen or twenty of our men have been provided with seats in Provincial
Cabinets.
What are we to do? Are we to acquiesce or fight? As far as I am concerned, that we should fight is a foregone
conclusion. All that remains if how
and when. We cannot fight unless everything is placed on a perfect war footing.
By giving us Ministries, the enemy feels that he has sealed our doom. But let us seal his doom with the same
instruments. Let us use this
opportunity to consolidate our position in the Provinces. Let the Ministries function in such a manner
that instead of discrediting themselves, they
popularize the League among the masses from whom we are mainly to draw when we
are on the war path. Collect funds. Consolidate the National Guards. Consider
from what side we are going to launch our attack. Let us exploit these Ministries so that when
we attack, the very fact that we are giving up our seats in the Government in
order to launch such an attack will add to our prestige.
When should we attack? I
think I should be ready with my plans by about next December. [Note in
original: The agent explains that the month of December is specifically stated
because in the acceleration of League activity, December has been chosen as the
month for the annual session which is usually held during Easter. By December also Jinnah will have judged more
definitely how the war situation stands and the annual session will provide an
opportunity for his plans to be reviewed.
A special session will probably we convened in the Punjab in April for
further consideration.]
Meanwhile, our Provincial
Ministries and Leagues will have completed the work of organization in the
Provinces and prepared themselves for the fight. Also we will have seen how the war goes
during the summer. In December we meet
in Sind. In April we meet in the
Punjab. There we decide when to strike,
where to strike and how to strike.
Personally I think that unless
unforeseen circumstances force us to act otherwise, we should begin our
offensive immediately on the termination of the war. Then everybody will be in a state of
exhaustion and unwilling to face a new ordeal.
It is true that the Britisher will by then be strong than anyone
else. But that strength of his will be
confined only to this that he shall stand no dictation from his Allies who
would be comparatively weaker than him. But for that reason alone he dare not
court fresh trouble on a large scale.
All we have to do to wrest our ideal from his unwilling hands will be
to create trouble on a large scale, and thus compel him to surrender. How did Afghanistan win her
independence? She declared war when the
World War had just ended. England was
exhausted and her pleasure-loving people would allow no new wars to be
fought. We should, if necessary and if
matters can be delayed till then, copy Afghanistan.
That, however, does not mean that
we should stay our hands, if provocation comes earlier. We
have already killed the Congress. Now it
is the turn of the British. The war
in my opinion may last another three years and we shold use that period to put
our house in order.
“In this connection, here are the
few points which should be borne in mind –
(1) Now
that we are in the Ministries, we should try to retain them as long as possible
so that we are able to use them as an instrument for consolidating our position
in the Provinces for the purposes of the impending fight.
(2) We should, if possible, avoid conflict with
the British until the arrival of the psychological moment and until our
preparations are completed.
(3) In
order to popularize the League with the masses, we should pass some good
legislation in the Provinces where Ministries are functioning. This will stand us in good stead in due time.
(4)
Meanwhile
discourage anything that will create dissensions in the Muslim Camp. For instance, discussion or determination of
fundamental rights for citizens of Pakistan, or production of a cut and dried
scheme for Pakistan must create controversies and differences of opinion and
should, therefore, be avoided for the present.
(5) The
fight being inevitable, we must make our preparations flawless.”
It was on account of this speech that the various
resolutions of which notice had been given were withdrawn, and the official
resolution, which was meant to serve only as a smoke-screen was passed.
4.
Other features of the Session were—
(1)
Rs. 29,000 were contributed by Sind members and
an equal sum by Punjab members towards the Jinnah fund. The Punjab Premier promised, on condition
that his name would not be announced, a donation of Rs. 7,000. Shaukat Hayat Khan offered Rs. 3,000, but his
offer was not accepted as it was thought that its acceptance at this stage,
when he had just been given the League ticket, would create
misunderstandings. Other donors were—
Rs.
The
Nawab of Mamdot in his own name, in the name of his
brother, &c. . . . . .
. . . . . . . 17,000
Mir Ghulam Ali of Sind . . . . .
. . . 10,000
Mir Bundeh Ali of Sind . . . . .
. . . 5,000
K. B. Khuro of Sind . . . . .
. . . . . 5,000
Sir Ghulam Husain Hidayatullah .
. . . . . 1,000
Gazdar, Law Minister, Sind . . . . .
. . . 1,000
K. B. Jalal-ud-din of Sind . . . . .
. . . 1,000
Pir Ellahi Bux . . . . .
. . . . . . . 1,000
Sir Maratab Ali of the Punjab .
. . . . . 5,000
Hassan Bux Shah of Sind . . . . .
. . . 2,500
The rest paid lesser sums. The
total amounted to some Rs. 60,000 (approx..).
The Jinnah Fund now stands at rupees six lakhs.
(2)
The Sind League quarrel, Jagirdars versus Jagirdar Tenants, had its echoes
in Delhi. Both the parties tried to get
the support of Jinnah. With a view to
win Jinnah’s sympathies, the Mirs of Sind, who are Jagirdars, were this time
unusually generous in their contributions.
G.M. Syed, the exponent of the other side is, however, unyielding. For the present, however, Qazi Isa and Nawab
Ismail Khan are going to Sind to look into these matters.
(3)
Shaukat Hayat has been given the League ticket
for his bye-election by the Central League Parliamentary Committee on his
placing his resignation in the hands of Jinnah to be used if and when
necessary. Meanwhile, both sides have
contracted to treat this matter with the utmost secrecy. Shaukat Hayat is believed to have made it
clear to Jinnah that, if it comes to a fight with the British, Jinnah must
release him from his obligations, because of his father’s long connections with
the British and because he is an Army officer, Shaukat Hayat will not go
against the British. Jinnah has seen his
point of view and agreed to let him out when necessary. For the present Jinnah appreciates that a
combination of Shaukat’s group with the Hindus and the Sikhs is a matter to be
reckoned with.
(4)
A resolution was passed urging the termination
of Martial Law in Sind and the restoration of Pir Pagaro’s property. Pir Ellahi Bux, tried to oppose it, but was
hooted down, thanks to the excellent arrangements made by Yusif Haroon and G.
M. Syed. It is most unlikely that the
Sind League Ministry will resign on the Pir Pagaro issue or the issue of the
lifting of Martial Law.
(5)
Resolutions were passed on the food problem, the
South African affair, Collective fines, Mr. Jinnah’s emergency powers, &c.,
&c.
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